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1 INTRODUCTION  
There are various techniques available to model 
the reliability of a system, such as fault trees, event 
trees, markov analysis. These models can be applied 
at the design stage to investigate alternative design 
options and influence the development of the sys-
tem. They can also be used to prove that the system 
will perform to the required standard (perhaps satis-
fying the regulatory requirements where failures are 
safety related with the potential to result in fatalities) 
once its design has been finalised. However the most 
beneficial way to use the models is at the design 
phase when there is the most flexibility in changing 
the design in response to the predicted performance. 
As the development of the mathematical model is 
quite a lengthy process this can limit its usefulness. 
As during the time the models are being developed 
for a specific system design, and analysed, the sys-
tem design independently progresses and evolves. 
Therefore the model and its influence lags behind 
the actual realised design. Another limiting factor is 
that design teams do often not have the expertise re-
quired to develop the models and it is therefore 
passed to a specialist group to perform the task. 
Hence resulting in a loss of overall control and 
project cohesion.  
Over the years much work has been performed on 
the analysis of the models and this is now well de-
veloped and can be performed quickly. The area that 
still involves significant time and effort is the con-
struction of the models. One way of improving this 
situation is to automate the construction process. 
This would make the analysis less complex enabling 
it to be performed by the design team. Automation 
also reduces the time of an analysis and can help 
prevent errors.  Due to these benefits the subject has 
received some attention, most of which has concen-
trated on the Fault Tree approach. Various model-
ling approaches have been adopted to generate the 
tree. The most commonly adopted approaches in-
clude digraphs (Lapp & Powers 1977), decision 
tables (Salem et al 1977), transition tables (Taylor 
1982) and mini fault trees (Kelly & Lees 1986). 
However no model has been developed which is ap-
propriate for all conditions. Although Fault Tree 
Analysis cannot be used to accurately analysis many 
systems the automation of the other available tech-
niques has received little attention.  The aim of the 
work presented here is to develop a procedure to au-
tomatically generate a reliability model for a system 
undertaking a phased mission.  Such a mission is 
made up of consecutive time periods, known as 
phases, within which the system may have to meet 
different requirements for successful completion of 
the phase. System failure during any phase will re-
sult in mission failure.  The main techniques that 
have been used in solving phased mission problems 
are Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis and simu-
lation. Both fault trees and markov suffer the prob-
lem of developing very large models for such prob-
lems. Simulation techniques however are well suited 
to modelling such situations as their computational 
nature allows for complex scenarios to be consi-
dered. One method that allows for simple graphical 
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representation as well as significant modelling pow-
er is the Petri net.  
2 PETRI NETS 
A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph with two 
types of node: places, which are circular, and transi-
tions, which are represented by bars. Places link on-
ly to transitions, and vice versa, using directed arcs. 
It is possible for a place to have several arcs to, or 
from, the same transition, which is condensed down 
into a single arc with a weight, or multiplicity, and 
denoted by a slash through the arc with a number 
next to it. If there is no lash the multiplicity is one. 
Tokens, or marks, reside within places and are 
passed between them by the switching of transitions. 
It is this switching of the transitions which 
represents the dynamic behaviour of the Petri net 
model. The net marking is a term given to the distri-
bution of the tokens throughout the whole Petri net, 
and each form of it represents a different system 
state. It is this which is of interest to the analyst. 
An example of transition switching is given in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Transition enabling and switching 
 
The figure shows a transition that has three places 
as inputs. A transition is said to be enabled when all 
the input places contain at least the weight number 
of tokens. In Figure 1 this is two for the top place, 
one for the middle place and three for the lowest 
place.  The transition has a time delay t associated 
with it, this forces the transition to postpone switch-
ing for a period of time t upon being enabled. This 
delay can be deterministic, sampled from a distribu-
tion, or zero, in which case the transition is 
represented by a solid bar. Once the time period has 
passed and the transition remains enabled, the 
switching takes place. This process removes the 
number of tokens in each input place corresponding 
to the multiplicity of the relevant arc and creates the 
weight number of tokens in each output place. This 
is shown in Figure 1 where the switching removes 
two, one and three tokens from the input places and 
deposits two tokens in the output place. 
3. AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF A PETRI 
NET MODEL OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY. 
The aim of the procedure outlined in this work is 
to automatically generate a Petri net model to deter-
mine the reliability of a system performing a phased 
mission. The procedure is based on the following 
steps: 
3.1  Requirements. 
In order to generate a model, information about 
the system and its usage is required. This informa-
tion falls into the categories of: component models, 
system topology, phase models, initial and starting 
conditions and failure conditions. The component 
models are in the form of decision tables which give 
a description of how the input and internal opera-
tional modes of each component influence the output 
states of that component. Operational mode tables, 
similar to the state transition tables used by Majdara 
and Wakabayashi 2009, are also adopted to model 
components with different operating modes. The 
system topology diagram describes how the compo-
nents are linked together. The phase models describe 
the different phases that the system undergoes and 
includes the length of each phase and any conditions 
that must be satisfied in the phase and to make a 
transition between phases. The initial conditions are 
any conditions that the components must satisfy at 
the start of the mission. The system may also require 
certain conditions to be satisfied to start the system. 
The failure conditions are the failure modes of the 
components and the system. As the procedure is cur-
rently in the stages of being developed to automati-
cally construct the model no component failure or 
repair data is yet necessary. This will be included at 
a later date.  
3.2 Model construction. 
In order to automatically generate the reliability 
model from the system description four distinct PN’s 
have been identified, component nets (CPN), circuit 
nets (CiPN), system nets (SPN) and phase nets 
(PPN). The CPN’s model the components failure 
and repair. The CiPN represent any circuits that are 
identified in the system and are used to determine 
whether current is being passed. Circuits are defined 
as a path starting and ending at the same component 
which passes current. These are obtained by starting 
at a power supply and tracing through the topology 
diagram. The SPN models the interactions between 
the components within the system and are developed 
using the decision tables, operational mode tables 
and the topology diagram. The PPN governs the 
phase progression and mission completion or aban-
donment. The different PN’s interact by arcs linking 
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places and transitions and these arcs are the mechan-
ism for passing information between the nets. 
3.3  Model simulation 
The PN’s described above will be used to simu-
late the system reliability. Software is currently be-
ing developed to perform this task.  The steps to be 
undertaken are: 
1 From the initial conditions of the system place 
tokens in the relevant places within the SPN. 
2 Place a token in the place representing phase 1 in 
the PPN. 
3 Randomly sample failure and repair times for the 
components from the relevant distribution. 
4 Search through each of the immediate transitions 
in the CPN, SPN and PPN and determine if any 
are enabled, if so fire them.  
5 If the operating mode of a component changes 
then check the CiPN and place a token in C/NC 
in the out place of the component.  
6  Repeat step 4. 
When any transition is fired test if any of the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied: 
 a phase transition condition is satisfied. If mission 
has finished, failure or success, log results and 
start new simulation. 
 In phase conditions are satisfied for current 
phase. Check for next timed transition and fire. 
4 EXAMPLE 
In order to demonstrate the procedure it is applied 
to a pressure tank control system. 
4.1  System description. 
The aim of the system, shown in Figure 2, is to 
control the filling and emptying of the tank. Initially 
the system is considered to be in a dormant state and 
thus de-energised. The switch (S1), the relay con-
tacts (RC) and the timer contacts (TC) are open, the 
switch (S2) is closed and the tank is empty. Depress-
ing S1 provides power to the timer relay (TIM) 
which results in the closure of its contacts, TC and 
the start of the timer mechanism. TIM self latches 
when S1 opens when released, and power is also 
supplied to relay (R) resulting in contacts, RC, clos-
ing which starts the motor (M) and hence pump (P). 
The tank (T) starts to fill. After a time t1 the contacts 
TC open, relay R de-energises and its contacts, RC, 
open thus removing power from M and hence P. 
When TIM is de-energised the timer clock is reset. 
The operator (OP) will notice the tank pressure by 
the pressure gauge (PG) and will open the valve (V) 
to empty the tank. After a time t2 the tank will have 
emptied sufficiently for filling to start again by OP 
pressing switch S1 and closing the valve. Switch S2 
is a safety mechanism built into the system so that in 
the event of a failure occurring and the tank overfil-
ling, the operator, who will be alerted by PG, can 
stop the pump by opening S2 hence denying power 
to R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. System schematic 
 
The system described operates in three distinct 
phases: 
1 Start up. This is a discrete phase only occurring 
momentarily when S1 is pressed. 
2 Fill up, length t1. In this phase, relay contacts TC 
and RC are closed, S1 is open, and V is closed. 
The tank will be filling.  
3 Empty, length t2. In this phase, relay contacts TC 
and RC are open, S1 is open, and V is open. The 
tank will be emptying. 
A reliability model is automatically constructed 
by the following steps.  
4.2  Inputs. 
A topology diagram for the system is constructed 
as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. System topology. 
 
The failure modes considered for the components 
in the system is shown in Table 1. Failure and repair 
rates have not been included as the example has 
been taken to demonstrate the construction process. 
Decision tables relevant to the components in the 
system are then constructed or obtained from a li-
brary of such tables that have been developed for the 
most common components. 
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Table 1. Component failure modes. 
Component   Failure Mode  Description 
Power Supply n   PSn_F    No Power 
PSn 
Switch n, Sn   Sn_FO    Switch n failed open 
Sn_FC    Switch n failed closed 
Timer relay   TC_FC    Contacts failed closed 
TIM      TC_FO    Contacts failed open 
       TIM_F    Relay failed de-energised 
Relay,R     RC_FC    Contacts failed closed 
       RC_FO    Contacts failed open 
       R_F     Relay failed de-energised 
Fuse, F     F_F     Fuse broken 
Motor, M    M_F     Motor broken, pump not 
             Started 
Pump,P     P_F     Pump broken, no pumping 
Valve, V    V_FC    Valve failed closed 
       V_FO    Valve failed open 
Pressure Gauge  PG_F    Fails to register pressure 
PG 
Operator , OP   OP_F    Operator fails to take  
action 
Tank,T     T_F     Significant leak in tank __________________________________________________ 
 
As an example of how to construct such a table 
consider the pump (P), which has one failure mode 
in this example. From the topology diagram it can be 
seen that pump has one input from the motor and 
one output to the tank. The input has two possible 
states ON or OFF. The decision table, Table 2, con-
siders all the possible combinations of the input and 
all possible states of P and the effects these will have 
on the output. In the table FL, NFL denote flow and 
no flow respectively. Considering the causes of flow 
in the output, from Table 2 it can be seen that only 
row 1 gives this result. This is the case when IN=ON 
and the pump is working. The combinations consi-
dered in rows 2 and 3 result in no flow in the output. 
The sign ‘-‘ in the input or state column indicates 
that the value of this particular variable does not af-
fect the output in this case. For example in row 2 of 
table 2 if the pump is failed then the output to the 
tank will be no flow regardless of the input from the 
motor.  
 
Table 2. Decision table for pump. 
 In State Out 
1 ON W FL 
2 - F NFL 
3 OFF - NFL 
 
For some components the output will also be de-
pendent upon time, this information is contained in 
the phase descriptions and is accounted for in the 
decision tables by adding an extra column for time.  
For example, for TIM, the output to the contacts, 
OUT1, is dependent upon time. This is shown in ta-
ble 3 where in row 1 for t<t1 OUT1=EN, but for 
1
tt   , row 2, OUT1=DE for the same input and 
component state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Decision table for the timer relay. 
 Time IN State     OUT1 OUT2 
1 <t1 C W EN C 
2 
1
tt 
 
C W DE C 
3 - - F DE NC 
4 - NC - DE NC 
 
In the table EN and DE denote energised and de-
energised respectively and C and NC denote current, 
no current. 
Also some of the components in the system have 
different operational modes, for example, the 
switches have two different modes, open or closed. 
The change in mode will be a result of a change in 
input. For these components the change in mode has 
been modelled using operational mode tables as well 
as decision tables. For example the operational mode 
table for switch S2 (and Valve V) is shown in table 
4. Both of these components have two modes, 
opened or closed, and their mode is changed by the 
operator through IN1, see Figure 3. As shown in ta-
ble 1 the components have two failure modes, FO 
and FC. In the operational mode table all possible 
combinations of the current mode (mode 1), the in-
put and the component state are considered and the 
effect on the mode (mode 2) determined. For exam-
ple, if the current mode is closed, the input is open 
and the component is working (row 3) then the new 
mode will be open. In the table the notation NA is 
used for no action from the operator.  
 
Table 4. Operational mode table for S2 and V. 
 Mode 1 IN1 State Mode 2 
1 Closed - FC Closed 
2 Closed CL - Closed 
3 Closed OP W Open 
4 Closed NA - Closed 
5 Open - FO Open 
6 Open OP - Open 
7 Open CL W Closed 
8 Open NA - Open 
  
Mode 2 is then used as the mode in the decision 
table. For example the decision table for switch is 
given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Decision table for S1, S2, TC, RC. 
 In2 Mode Out 
1 - Open NC 
2 NC - NC 
3 C Closed C 
 
The remaining operational mode tables and deci-
sion tables are shown in tables  6- 16. 
 
Table 6. Operational mode table for S1 
 Mode 
1 
IN1 State Mode 2 
1 Closed - FC Closed 
2 Closed CL - Closed 
3 Closed NA W Open 
4 Open - FO Open 
5 Open NA - Open 
6 Open CL W Closed 
 
Table 7. Operational mode table for TC, RC. 
 Mode 1 IN1 State Mode 2 
1 Closed - FC Closed 
2 Closed EN - Closed 
3 Closed DE W Open 
4 Open - FO Open 
5 Open DE - Open 
6 Open EN W Closed 
 
Table 8. Decision table for PSn, n=1,2 
 In State Out 
1 C W C 
2 - F NC 
3 NC - NC 
 
Table 9. Decision table for R 
 In State Out1 Out2 
1 C W EN C 
2 - F DE NC 
3 NC - DE NC 
 
Table 10. Decision table for the junctions 1-4. 
 In1 In2 Out1 Out2 
1 C - C  
2 - C C  
3 NC NC NC  
4 C  C C 
5 NC  NC NC 
 
Table 11. Decision table for F. 
 In State Out 
1 C W C 
2 - F NC 
3 NC - NC 
 
Table 12. Decision table for M. 
 In State Out1 Out2 
1 C W C ON 
2 - F NC OFF 
3 NC - NC OFF 
 
Table 13. Decision table for T 
 t In1 In2 State Out1 Out2 
1 - FL OP W CONST FL 
2 - FL CL W INC NFL 
3 - NFL CL W CONST NFL 
4 ≤t1 NFL OP W CONST NFL 
5 t1<t≤t1+ t2 NFL OP W DEC FL 
6 ≤ t1 - - F CONST NFL 
7 t1<t≤t1+ t2 - - F DEC NFL 
 
 
 
Table 14. Decision table for PG 
         t In State Out 
1 < t1 - W LPR 
2 t1 Const W LPR 
3 t1 Inc W HPR 
4 - Dec W LPR 
5 t1 < t < t1+ t2  Const W HPR 
6 t1 < t < t1+ t2 Inc W VHPR 
7 - - F NR 
 
 
Table 15. Decision table for OP 
 t In1 State Out1 Out2 Out3 
1 0 LPR W CL NA CL 
2 0<t<t1+ t2 LPR W NA NA NA 
3 - HPR W OP NA NA 
4 - VHPR W NA OP NA 
5 - - F NA NA NA 
6 0 NR W CL NA CL 
7 0<t<t1+ t2 NR W NA NA NA  
 
Table 16. Decision table for V 
 In2 Mode Out1 Out2 
1 - Closed NFL CL 
2 NFL Open NFL OP 
3 NFL Closed NFL CL 
4 FL Open FL OP 
 
In the tables LPR, HPR and VHPR denote low 
pressure, high pressure and very high pressure re-
spectively, NR denotes no reading and NA denotes 
no action.  
The initial conditions are that switch 2 and Valve 
are closed and that switch 1, relay R contacts and 
timer relay TIM contacts are open, i.e. 
S2_Mode=Closed,  
V_Mode=Closed,  
RC_Mode=Open,   
TC_Mode=Open, 
 S1_Mode=Open 
The system is started when the operator closes 
switch 1, i.e.  S1_IN1=CL 
The failure modes of the system have been bro-
ken down into ‘system overfill’ and ‘others’ as it is 
considered that overfill will be the most serious con-
sequence. If overfill occurs the system can be suc-
cessfully shutdown or continue. The method could 
be adapted to consider other failure modes. In the 
algorithm these failure states have been modelled as 
separate phases, The mission is considered to be a 
success if the phases 1-3 are completed. Hence there 
are eight phases to consider.  
1 Start up 
2 Fill 
3 Empty 
4 System overfill  
5 System shutdown due to overfill 
6 System overfill and no shutdown 
7 Failure of the system other than overfill. 
8 Mission success 
From the system description the phase transition 
conditions can be determined as shown in table 17. 
 
Table 17. Phase transition conditions 
 t From 
Phase 
To 
Phase 
Condition 
1 0 1 2 TC_MODE= Closed 
2 0 1 7 TC_MODE = Open 
3 t1 2 3 PG_OUT = HPR 
4 - 2 4 PG_OUT = VHPR 
5 t1 2 7 PG_OUT = LPR 
6 - 2 7 RC_MODE=Open 
7 t1+t2 3 8 PG_OUT = LPR 
8 - 3 4 PG_OUT = VHPR 
9 t1+t2 3 7 PG_OUT = HPR 
10 - 4 5 RC_MODE=Open 
11 - 4 6 RC_MODE=Closed 
 
 
The in phase conditions for the operational phases 
are: 
1: S1_mode=closed,  
2: T_IN1=FL, V_mode=closed,  
3: T_IN1=NFL, V_mode=open. 
4.3 Petri Net development 
The different nets identified earlier, CPN, CiPN, 
SPN and PPN for this example are considered be-
low.   
4.3.1 Component Petri Nets 
These are elementary nets for this simple no re-
pair example and can be generated from the compo-
nent descriptions. For the majority of the compo-
nents they just consist of two places to define a 
working and failed state and a transition to model 
the time to failure, tF, Figure 4. For some compo-
nents the failed state will be dependent upon the cur-
rent operation mode, the CPN’s for such compo-
nents in this example are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CPN’s for PS1, PS2, TIM, R, F,M,P,PG,OP and T. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. CPN’s for S1, S2, V, TC and RC. 
4.3.2 Circuit Petri Nets 
In this example there are five circuits, C1= {PS1, 
S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, TC, J1, PS1}, C2= {PS1, S2, J2, 
TIM, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}, C3= {PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, 
J4, TC, J1, PS1}, C4= {PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, S1, J1, 
PS1}and C5= {PS2, F, RC, M, PS2}. Circuit Petri 
nets are developed by considering the components in 
each circuit and using the decision tables to deter-
mine when they pass, or do not pass, current. As an 
example the Petri nets for current in circuit 1 and no 
current in circuit 1 are shown in figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Petri nets for current in circuit 1 and no current in cir-
cuit 1. 
4.3.3 System Petri Nets 
From the information contained in the decision 
tables, Petri nets can be generated that model the ef-
fects upon the component output of the various 
combinations of inputs and component states. For 
example, figure 7 shows the Petri net generated from 
tF 
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the operational mode, and decision, table for S1, 
tables 6 and 5 respectively. Row 1 of table 6 states 
that if the mode is closed and the state is FC then 
mode remains closed, this is shown in the Petri net 
by the transition which has inputs ‘FC’ and 
‘mode=closed’ and outputs to ‘mode=closed’. The 
other rows are represented in a similar way. As 
switch S1 is a push button switch which opens when 
released the net also includes a transition, of delay , 
which has as input place ‘IN1=CL’ and output place 
‘IN1=NA’.  The nets generated in this way are 
linked to form a SPN from the information in the to-
pology diagram. Part of this net is shown in Figure 
7. The dashed arcs in the figures represent links 
from other nets, CPN’s, CiPN’s or PPN’s, or from 
elsewhere in the SPN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Petri net generated from tables 6 and 5. 
 
Figure 7. Part of the SPN 
 
4.3.4 Phase Petri Net 
The PPN controls the sequence of phases and 
failure, or success, of the mission and is generated 
from the phase information and the phase transition 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Part of the PPN for the example. 
 
  Part of the PPN for the example is shown in 
Figure 8. From the phase transition table, table 17, it 
is known that the transition between phase 1 and 2 
occurs if TC mode=closed and the transition be-
tween 1 and 7 if TC mode=open. These transitions 
are seen in Figure 8 when tokens are in the places 
representing phase 1 and TC mode=closed and TC 
mode in open respectively. Paces in this net are also 
linked to places in the SPN.  
 
5 SIMULATION MODEL. 
Having generated the model as detailed above, 
the steps outlined in section 3.3 will be underta-
ken in order to predict the reliability of the sys-
tem. This is the current area of the work being 
undertaken. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In tnis work a procedure has been outlined to au-
tomatically generate the reliability model for a sys-
tem performing a phased mission. Employing the 
system topology diagram and decision and operating 
mode tables Petri nets are developed to model the 
system. Phase information is used to construct Petri 
nets that control the sequence of phases. For the sys-
tems considered to date Petri nets have also been de-
veloped to model the circuits within the systems. As 
this work is extended and a wider variety of systems 
are consiederd it it anticipated that the procedure 
will be adapted to deal with systems without circuits. 
The model developed can then be used to esti-
mate the system reliability and the procedure to 
achieve this has been outlined in this work This 
stage of the work is currently in process. 
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